The massive defection of opposition politicians to Nigeria’s ruling APC, while appearing as a political triumph for President Tinubu ahead of 2027, masks deeper structural vulnerabilities that could destabilize both the party and Nigeria’s democracy.
By Peter Imini
Nigeria’s political landscape is witnessing an unprecedented exodus. In recent weeks, senators, House of Representatives members, state legislators, and even a sitting governor have abandoned the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for the All Progressives Congress (APC). The numbers are staggering: two senators from Rivers State—Allwell Onyesoh and Barinada Mpigi—defected on December 23, joining six House members who made the same move days earlier. Governor Siminalyi Fubara of Rivers State formally joined the APC on December 5, preceded by 15 members of the Rivers State House of Assembly.
The ruling party and its supporters have celebrated these defections as validation of President Bola Tinubu’s leadership and evidence of the “noticeable gains” from his reform program, as Special Adviser Bayo Onanuga put it. APC leaders present at the Senate to witness the crossover described it as “a significant boost to the party’s influence” ahead of the 2027 elections. With the latest Senate defections, the APC now commands 77 seats compared to the PDP’s 24—a dominance that appears to give Tinubu and his party overwhelming control.
But beneath this triumphalist narrative lies a more complex and potentially volatile reality. What the APC is experiencing may not be strength but rather a dangerous accumulation of contradictions—a political time bomb that could explode spectacularly.
The strategic calculation behind the defections
The defectors have offered similar justifications for their moves. Onyesoh cited “the importance of aligning with the centre and the political will to transform the fortunes of my people,” while Mpigi pointed to “unresolved issues and divisions” within the PDP. These explanations sound reasonable on the surface, but they reveal a transactional approach to politics that prioritizes access to federal power over ideological commitment or grassroots loyalty.
The Rivers State defections are particularly instructive. The mass movement to the APC followed Governor Fubara’s decision to switch parties amid his well-publicized feud with his predecessor and current Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike. The defections suggest a pattern: politicians are joining the APC not necessarily because they believe in its vision, but because they calculate that proximity to federal power offers better prospects for political survival and resource access.
This interpretation gains credibility when we consider the role of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in current political dynamics. While the Presidency insists that “President Tinubu does not issue directives to any anti-corruption agency on whom to investigate, arrest, or prosecute,” opposition figures have noted a curious pattern: many politicians facing EFCC scrutiny have found relief after defecting to the ruling party. Whether by coincidence or design, the message is clear—being outside the APC tent may be hazardous to one’s political and legal health.
What Tinubu and the APC may be up to
President Tinubu appears to be pursuing a strategy of political consolidation ahead of the 2027 elections. By absorbing opposition figures, especially from critical states like Rivers, the APC aims to achieve several objectives simultaneously.
First, it weakens opposition structures. The PDP, already struggling with internal divisions, loses not just numbers but also regional strongmen who controlled political machinery and resources. As the party now retains just three representatives from Rivers State in the House, its ability to mount effective opposition in that oil-rich state has been decimated.
Second, it creates an appearance of inevitability. When even opposition politicians seem to conclude that the APC is the only viable platform, it demoralizes remaining opposition supporters and creates a bandwagon effect. This psychological warfare can be as effective as actual electoral victory.
Third, it provides a narrative of success. The Presidency can point to the defections as evidence that Tinubu’s policies are working, even when economic indicators suggest otherwise. If prominent politicians are joining the government, surely it must be doing something right? However, this strategy carries enormous risks that the APC may be underestimating.
The time bomb: Why this could explode
Senate Minority Leader Abba Moro captured the danger succinctly when he warned that “when you overload a boat midstream, the possible consequence is the load capsizing.” His metaphor is apt. The APC is taking on board politicians who bring not just their ambitions but also their factional conflicts, corruption allegations, and competing interest groups.
The first explosive element is ideological incoherence. A party that stands for everything stands for nothing. When politicians of wildly different backgrounds and commitments join the same party purely for transactional reasons, the party loses any coherent identity. This makes governance difficult because there’s no shared vision to guide policy decisions, only competing interests to be managed.
The second danger is internal competition. Each defector comes with expectations—ministerial appointments, contracts, influence over party structures, protection from prosecution. The APC cannot satisfy everyone. Rivers State alone now has multiple political heavyweights within the APC—Wike, Fubara, and numerous legislators—all expecting their share of resources and influence. These competing ambitions will eventually collide, potentially triggering internal conflicts more destructive than any opposition challenge.
The third risk is democratic decay. As Moro noted, the wholesale absorption of the opposition represents “a dangerous drift in Nigeria’s democracy.” Democracy requires robust opposition to check executive power, offer alternative policies, and represent diverse viewpoints. When opposition collapses not because citizens rejected it but because politicians calculated that opposition doesn’t pay, democratic accountability suffers.
The fourth time bomb is constituency backlash. The defecting politicians claimed they needed to “align with the centre” to serve their constituents effectively. But voters in those constituencies chose them on PDP platforms. Many constituents feel betrayed by these switches, creating potential electoral vulnerabilities. If the APC cannot deliver tangible benefits quickly, these constituencies may punish both the party and the defectors in 2027.
Finally, there’s the corruption question. The EFCC has reportedly traced properties worth billions to figures associated with the previous administration, yet investigations seem to proceed selectively. This creates a two-tier system where political affiliation determines accountability. When corruption prosecution becomes politicized, it undermines both anti-corruption efforts and political legitimacy. Eventually, the accumulated frustration over selective justice could fuel public anger that no amount of political maneuvering can contain.
The verdict
The APC’s absorption of opposition politicians may appear tactically brilliant in the short term. It gives Tinubu numerical dominance and weakens opposition structures ahead of 2027. But strategy requires thinking several moves ahead. The contradictions being absorbed into the APC—ideological incoherence, competing ambitions, corruption allegations, and constituency resentment—represent a delayed-action explosive.
Political parties are not just vehicles for winning elections; they’re supposed to be institutions with identities, values, and grassroots connections. When they become purely transactional clearing houses for ambitious politicians, they hollow out from within. The PDP’s current crisis resulted partly from similar dynamics—it became a big tent with too many contradictions, eventually tearing itself apart.
The APC may be repeating this mistake on a larger scale. The defectors will eventually discover that the federal government’s resources, however vast, cannot satisfy everyone’s appetites. When the competition for diminishing resources intensifies, when some defectors realize they’ve been used and discarded, when constituencies punish politicians who betrayed their mandate, when selective prosecution finally loses its deterrent effect—the accumulated pressures could fracture the APC just when it seems most dominant.
As Moro warned, the boat is being dangerously overloaded. The question is not whether it will capsize, but when—and how many will go down with it when it does.