Former Ekiti Governor Ayo Fayose’s assertion that President Tinubu will sacrifice Governor Siminalayi Fubara for FCT Minister Nyesom Wike fundamentally miscalculates the institutional realities of Nigerian politics, as Fubara’s position as a sitting APC governor with control over state resources, backing from party leadership including Vice President Shettima and APC National Secretary Basiru, and growing support from traditional rulers like former Governor Peter Odili and organizations like PANDEF makes him the clear winner in a battle where Wike—a PDP member without formal APC affiliation who has alienated party structures through arrogant overreach—represents a politically unsustainable arrangement that even grateful presidents must eventually abandon in favor of institutional order over personal loyalty.
by Nij Martin
Former Ekiti State Governor Ayo Fayose has waded into the Rivers State political crisis with a remarkably tone-deaf analysis that misreads both contemporary Nigerian politics and the power dynamics at play. His assertion that Governor Siminalayi Fubara should prostrate before FCT Minister Nyesom Wike and accept him as his political leader betrays a fundamentally outdated understanding of how power is shifting in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. More critically, Fayose’s prediction that President Bola Tinubu will sacrifice Fubara for Wike miscalculates both the president’s interests and the irreversible momentum building behind the embattled governor.
Fayose’s arguments rest on a nostalgic view of Nigerian politics where godfathers reign supreme and political gratitude trumps institutional legitimacy. His comparison of Rivers to Lagos—suggesting that just as Tinubu controls Lagos despite Sanwo-Olu being governor, so too should Wike control Rivers despite Fubara being governor—fundamentally misunderstands crucial differences between these situations.
The Lagos comparison fails on multiple levels. Tinubu’s influence in Lagos is built on decades of systematic institution-building, not just personal patronage. He created a political machine spanning local governments, party structures, and business interests—something Wike attempted but never fully consolidated. More importantly, Tinubu is now President of Nigeria, giving him legitimate national authority that extends naturally to his home state. Wike, by contrast, is merely a minister without formal APC membership, operating from borrowed authority.
Fayose’s claim that Tinubu will not sacrifice Wike because “Wike came from Rivers to give support to President Tinubu” and “Wike is in Abuja performing” fundamentally miscalculates presidential politics. Yes, Wike’s support was valuable in 2023. But political debts have expiration dates, and Wike’s is rapidly approaching. What Fayose fails to grasp is that presidents think institutionally, not personally. The question isn’t “Who helped me more?” but “What serves my administration’s interests?”
From that institutional perspective, the calculation is straightforward. Fubara is a sitting APC governor in an oil-rich state who controls state resources and represents the party’s presence in the South-South. Wike is a PDP member serving as minister without formal party affiliation, creating constant complications for APC structures. Moreover, Wike’s increasingly erratic behavior—threatening APC leaders, dismissing party hierarchy, claiming ownership of an entire state—has become an embarrassment undermining rather than strengthening the president’s position.
Vice President Kashim Shettima already signaled the administration’s position when he declared that defecting governors become leaders of the APC in their states. He specifically mentioned that Governor Babagana Zulum leads the APC in Borno despite Shettima being vice president. This wasn’t casual talk—it was deliberate policy articulation. Fubara, as a sitting APC governor, automatically becomes the party leader in Rivers. Wike’s protests about “001” registration numbers are semantic distractions from this institutional reality.
APC National Secretary Senator Ajibola Basiru further reinforced this by explicitly declaring Fubara the party leader in Rivers State. When Wike attacked Basiru and demanded he “leave Rivers State alone,” he declared war on the APC’s national leadership. This was catastrophic miscalculation. Fayose dismisses these signals, but they represent considered institutional positions. The APC has made its choice, and it’s Fubara.
Fayose’s psychological analysis—that Fubara should show gratitude and humility—reveals his own limitations. He asks, “What does it take away from you?” to prostrate before Wike. The answer is: everything. It takes away gubernatorial authority, institutional legitimacy, and the independence necessary to govern effectively. Rivers State voters elected Fubara as governor, not as Wike’s representative. His mandate comes from the people, not from his predecessor’s endorsement.
The emergency rule that Fayose claims “saved” Fubara actually demonstrated the governor’s resilience. Rather than breaking him, the six-month suspension allowed Fubara to regroup, build new alliances, and emerge stronger. His subsequent defection to the APC was strategically brilliant—it aligned him with federal power while isolating Wike, who remains in the opposition PDP while serving in an APC government.
Fayose’s assertion that “you didn’t know about Fubara three years ago” actually undermines Wike. If Fubara was truly unknown and unimportant, how did he survive two years of relentless assault from one of Nigeria’s most ruthless political operators? How did he successfully defect to the ruling party and secure backing from its national leadership? The answer is that Fubara proved more capable than anyone, including Wike, anticipated.
The support Fubara is receiving validates this assessment. Former Governor Peter Odili has publicly assured Fubara that “Rivers people said that wherever you go, we will go with you. Wherever you stand, we will stand with you.” This endorsement matters because Odili represents Rivers State’s broader political establishment. The Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) has condemned the impeachment proceedings. The Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) has demolished Wike’s claims of leading a “rainbow coalition,” revealing them as fantasy.
Most tellingly, multiple political parties are reportedly considering not fielding governorship candidates in Rivers in 2027 to show solidarity with Fubara. This signals that the political class recognizes Wike’s behavior as destabilizing and dangerous to democratic norms. They see Fubara as defending institutional integrity against personal tyranny.
Wike’s strategic position is actually far weaker than Fayose acknowledges. He is a PDP member serving in an APC government—a position with no precedent and no institutional grounding. He has no formal role in the APC, yet he demands to control its affairs in Rivers. This arrangement worked temporarily because Tinubu valued his 2023 support, but it was always unsustainable.
Moreover, Wike’s temperament now works against him. His arrogant assertion that Rivers State is his personal political domain, his public humiliation of APC officials, his inflammatory statements—all of this paints a picture not of confident leadership but of desperate overreach. Former members of the APC National Working Committee are describing him as “an albatross” for the president. That’s devastating terminology from within party structures.
Fayose’s confidence that Tinubu will stand by Wike also ignores practical political mathematics. The president needs Rivers State’s votes for 2027. Fubara, as sitting governor with control over state resources and growing popular support, can actually deliver Rivers for Tinubu. Wike, isolated in the PDP while serving as minister, commanding a shrinking faction, and facing rejection from traditional rulers and civil society, represents diminishing returns.
The impeachment proceedings Wike orchestrated through 26 loyal legislators have backfired spectacularly. Rather than weakening Fubara, they’ve exposed Wike’s tactics and generated sympathy for the governor. The proceedings lack legitimacy precisely because everyone understands they’re driven by wounded pride rather than genuine governance concerns.
Fayose’s analysis also fails to account for changing political currency in Nigeria. The old model where a godfather’s endorsement guaranteed electoral victory is dying. Social media, increased voter awareness, and anti-establishment sentiment have created an environment where perceived oppression by political elites backfires. Wike’s bullying tactics now generate backlash. His treatment of Fubara has created a sympathy narrative that Fubara’s team is skillfully exploiting.
The broader political landscape also works against Wike. If Tinubu sides with Wike, he signals that ministers can override governors, that party structures don’t matter, and that personal loyalty trumps institutional order. This would create chaos in every state where ministers and governors coexist. If he sides with Fubara, he establishes clear hierarchy and strengthens institutional order. The choice is obvious for any president thinking strategically.
Fayose’s mistake is assuming Tinubu views politics through the same lens of personal obligation that defined an earlier era. But Tinubu didn’t become president by being sentimental or by honoring outdated political debts at the expense of strategic advantage. He understands that institutions must eventually triumph over individuals if a party is to remain viable.
The succession dynamics also matter. If Tinubu allows Wike to destroy Fubara, he establishes a dangerous precedent where any godfather can destabilize any governor indefinitely. This would paralyze governance nationwide. Conversely, if he backs Fubara, he establishes that governors have institutional protection against predecessors’ interference.
Finally, Fayose’s reading of Tinubu’s silence as support for Wike fundamentally misunderstands presidential strategy. By remaining silent while his subordinates signal support for Fubara, Tinubu achieves multiple objectives. He lets institutional processes play out, avoids making the fight personal, preserves some relationship with Wike, and still ensures the outcome he wants.
The trajectory is clear. Fubara will secure his second term with APC support. Wike will remain FCT minister for now but will gradually lose relevance as his leverage evaporates. The 26 legislators loyal to him will either reconcile with Fubara or face political irrelevance. And Rivers State will move forward with Fubara as its undisputed leader, not because he’s more ruthless than Wike, but because he represents institutional legitimacy that even presidents must ultimately respect.
Ayo Fayose is wrong because he’s fighting yesterday’s battles with yesterday’s logic. Nigerian politics is evolving beyond the godfather model he holds dear, and Nyesom Wike’s defeat in Rivers State will mark another milestone in that evolution. The minister’s increasingly desperate tactics are symptoms of a man losing control and watching his political empire crumble. Fubara, meanwhile, is building something more sustainable: institutional authority backed by popular legitimacy. That’s why he’ll win, and why those who bet against him will be proven wrong.